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Cross　Cultural　Communication　Failure：
　　　　　　　　　The　Pacific　War　Paradigm
James　Brown
’lThe　object　of　war　is　not　to　die　for　your　country　but　to　make　the　other
bastard　die　for　his．lf
Attributed　to　Gen．　George　Patton，　U．S．　Army
”Bushido　is　the　search　for　a　place　to　die．”Quoted　by　Yokota　Yutaka，　kaiten
（”Kamikaze　torpedo）pilot（Cook　p．309）
Introduction
　　　Unlike　most　other　wars　fought　by　American　forces，　the　war　against　the
Japanese　in　the　Pacific　took　on　a　different　character－aquality　that　was
characterized　by　an　almost　complete　dehumanization　of　the　enemy，　a　failure　to
abide　by　the”rules　of　warfare”，　and　a　willingness　to　commit　acts　of
unprecedented　destruction．
　　　War　has　been　called”the　continuation　of　politics　by　other　means．”To　this
could　be　added　that　war　is　cross－cultural　communication　by　other　means．　Each
combatant　brings　expectations　about　its　own　and　its　adversary’s　behavior　to　the
conflict　and－as　with　all　forms　of　communication－modifies　its　behavior
according　to　how　the　expectations　are　fulfilled．
　　　This　paper　will　discuss　how　each　side　in　the　Pacific　War（1941～1945）
modified　its　behavior　to　its　adversary，　resulting　in　a　war　that　brought　out　the
worst　in　each－both　in　terms　of　behavior　towards　its　enemy　and　in　terms　of　its
own　values．
The　Japanese　Road　to　Pearl　Harbor
　　　It　is　often　forgotten　among　Americans　that　the　war　did　not　begin　for　the
Japanese　on　December　7，1941．　Manchuria　was　occupied　after　a　series　of
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”incidents”in　1931　and　China　itself　invaded　in　1937．
　　　In　fact，　the　Imperial　Japanese　Army（IJA）had　more　troops　deployed　in
China　and　Manchuria　than　in　all　areas　of　the　Pacific　Theater　combined．　At　the
end　of　hostilities　in　1945，　there　were　more　than　1．5　million　IJA　soldiers　bogged
down　in　China　and　another　1．1　million　facing　the　Soviets　in　Manchuria
（Dunnigan，　p．309）It　was　largely　in　this　conflict　that　the　IJA　set　the　tone　for　its
tactics　and　ethic　for　the　Pacific　War　which　started　at　Pearl　Harbor．　A　tone　and
ethic－”hyper－Bushido”－which　they　brought　to　the　battlefield　with　the
Americans．
　　　As　Japan　occupied　the　port　facilities　along　the　Chinese　coast　after　1937，
supply　for　the　Nationalist　forces　by　the　Americans，　for　example，　became
increasingly　difficult．　As　a　result，　the　Japanese，　having　control　of　the　air　and
employing　their　highly　developed　infantry　tactics　of　using”shock　troops曹，－all
of　whom　were　willing　to　die　on　the　battlefield－rarely　lost　a　battle　against　the
ill－armed　and　less　well－trained　Chinese．　Despite　the　battle－to－battle　victories，
however，　the　Japanese　could　find　no　way　to　actually　win　the　war　and　gain　an
end　to　Chinese　military　activity　against　them．
　　　Assault　and　occupation　of　key　Chinese　towns　and　cities　became　the
standard　strategy　with　the　hope　of　cutting　off　Nationalist　forces　from　their
supplies　which　came　in　through　ports　on　the　Chinese　coast，　French　Indo－China，
and”over　the　hump”by　air　from　Burma．　One　after　the　other　most　of　these　lines
of　supply　were　cut，　but　resistance　did　not　seem　to　fade　as　the　Chinese　withdrew
ever　further　into　the　depths　of　their　continental　expanse．　Finally，　the
Nationalists　moved　their　capital　to　Chungking（Chonqing）from　which　the
Japanese，　despite　continuous　bombing，　were　unable　to　dislodge　them．
　　　In　fighting　this　war　against　the　Chinese，　the　Japanese　adopted　a　strategy　of
l’total　war”．　In　principle，　this　meant　that　no　difference　was　made　between　the
combat　soldier　and　the　civilian　population　from　which　he　was　drawn．　In
practice，　this　resulted　in　the　IJA　indiscriminately　bombing　civilian　targets，　using
poisonous　gas，　attempting　to　use　biological　weapons，　and　otherwise　killing　large
numbers　of　Chinese　who　happened　to　be　in　the　way．　The　Rape　of　Nanking
（Nanjing）is　but　one　of　the　more　hideous　examples．　IJA　forces　went　on　a
rampage　of　rape，　looting，　and　random　killing　that　resulted　in　the　deaths　of　at
least　tens　of　thousands　of　Chinese　including　POWs（Honda，　p．245）．　Other
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棚　　蜘 憾狸聖縄雌判←雛t雫鱒■匿
　、絢井106ー↑05野田　　．」・爾少尉さらに延長戦難難難謄醗輝蒲難麟
examples　of　casual　brutality　include　the　fact　that　when　IJA　soldiery　were　first
brought　over　to　China，　they　were　required　to”toughen　themselves”by　using
their　bayonets　or　swords（depending　on　their　rank）against　live　Chinese
prisoners（Cook　p．41～42）．　In　addition，　the　Japanese　public　was　treated　to
articles　about　the　activities　of　their　fighting　men　in　China　which　glorified　the
war　and　the　killing　of　Chinese　captives．　The　fourth　of　a　series，　the　one　shown
above（public　dornain　photo）depicts　a　competition　between　two　Japanese
officers　to　see　who　could　behead　100　Chinese　first．　Written　like　a　sports　report，
the　headline　reads，”100　Beheadings，　Record　Exceeded．　Mukai－106，　Noda－105
Both　lieutenants　head　into　overtime’膠．　Since　the　end　of　the　war，　there　has　been
some　debate　about　the　veracity　of　the　four　reports　by　the　reporter　for　the
newspaper，　but　there　is　no　question　that　the　articles　appeared，　that　they　casually
represented　what　the　Japanese　public　took　to　be　the　truth，　and　that　such
brutalities　were　a　daily　part　of　the　IJA’s　work　in　China．
　　　In　fact，　very　few　Chinese　were　actually　taken　prisoner　and　kept　as　POWs　in
conventional　camps　by　the　Japanese，　and　in　many　cases　orders　to　kill　POWs
were　explicit（Honda，　p．192）．
　　　The　issue　of　the　treatment　of　prisoners　of　war　is　one　which　loomed　large　in
the　post－war　tribunals，　and　it　was　in　China　that　the　IJA　set　the，’standard”for
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how　the　war　in　the　Pacific　would　eventually　be　fought．　Proper　treatment　of
prisoners　of　war　is　outlined　in　the　Geneva　Conventions　of　1929　to　which　Japan
was　a　signatory．　The　treaty　was　never　ratified　in　Japan，　however，　with　the
Japanese　claiming　that　such　provisions　for　the　treatment　of　POWs　were
essentially　unfair．　It　would　be　only　the　Japanese　who　would　have　to　provide
this　treatment　to　foreign　POWs　as　no　Japanese　soldier　would　allow　himself　to　be
captured（田村，2005，¶［paragraph］4）．　The”total　war”strategy　also　applied　at
home，　as　the　whole　population　of　Japan　was　expected　to　fight　as”one　bullet”，
and　that　each　citizen　as　well　as　its　fighting　men　should　be　prepared　to　die　for
the　Emperor　and　the　country．
　　　Bogged　down　in　a　quagmire　of　rnajor　fighting　since　1937　and　facing　what
it　perceived　as　discriminatory　sanctions　by　the　US　and　the　other　Western
powers，　Japan　hatched　a　plan　to　gain　vital　resources　on　its　own　by　attacking　to
the　south．　This　operation　which　included　the　attack　on　American　forces　in
Hawaii，　however，　did　not　contain　any　plan　for　victory　against　the　United　States．
There　were　no　military　proposals　for　an　invasion　of　California，　a　march　across
the　continent，　and　a　signing　of　surrender　documents　in　the　White　House，　for
example．　The　most　that　the　Japanese　military　could　hope　to　achieve　was　a
delay　in　when　the　US　would　retaliate，　or　a　hope　that　they　could　somehow
overcome　”盾浮秩@outnumbering　enemy　with　the　utmost　efforts　of　our　numerically
inferior　officers　and　rnen”（Ugaki，　p．7）．
　　　December　8，1941　dawned　in　Japan　with　the　Japanese　public　largely
supportive　of　the　war　in　China　and　the　occupation　of　Manchuria，　and　not
suspecting　that　a　new　front　would　be　opened　against　the　United　States．
The　American　Road　to　Pearl　Harbor
　　　The　war　in　Europe　had　begun　with　the　German　attack　on　Poland　on
September　1，1939，　but　the　Americans　were　not　directly　involved　as　they　had
no　international　commitments　to　defend　Poland　as　did　the　British　and　the
French．　In　addition，　the　Neutrality　Act　of　1939　specifically　prohibited　American
involvement　in　the　war．　The　American　public，　for　its　part，　was　still　relatively
isolationist，　despite　its　leadership’s　analysis　that　participation　in　the　war　might
be　inevitable．　In　November　of　1939，　the　US　provided”cash　and　carry’l　weapons
sales　to　the　allies　in　Europe．　American　concern　about　European　developments
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did　not　become　acute　until　the　spring　of　1940　when　the　Germans　first　invaded
the　lowlands　and　then　France，　pushing　British　forces　into　the　sea　at　Dunkirk
（Rose，2005，¶8）．
　　　Despite　the　gloomy　progress　of　the　war　in　Europe　and　President　Roosevelt電s
eagerness　to　support　the　enemies　of　fascism，　the　US　Congress　did　not　vote　the
”Lend　Lease”program　until　the　spring　of　1941．　This　provision　allowed　for　the
United　States　to　give　military　supplies　to　the　British　to　the　extent　that　such
materiel”promote（d）the　Defense　of　the　United　States”．　In　addition，　Congress
specifically　stipulated　in　the　Act　that　it　was　not　to　be　construed　to　allow
American　forces　to　escort　the　delivery　of　the　materiel　or　to　enter　the　war　zone．
There　was　little　popular　support　for　involvement　in　the　war　in　Europe．　As　late
as　summer　1941，　an　article　in　Time　Magazine　even　criticized　the　Lend－Lease
program　for　its　alleged　abuses　by　the　recipient（Britain）（Uncle　Sucker？，1941，¶
1）．
　　　Despite　popular　concerns　about　entry　into　the　war　in　Europe，　by　early　1941
President　Roosevelt　was　already　engaged　in　discussions　with　Prime　Minister
Churchill　about　the　progress　of　the　war．　Churchill　was　eager　for　the　US　to
become　rnore　actively　involved　and　insisted　on　a”Europe　First”policy　in　the
event　that　Japan　undertook　hostile　action　in　Southeast　Asia（Skates，　p．10）．　By
July　of　1941，　Japan　had　taken　advantage　of　the　fact　that　the　German－controlled
government　of　France　in　Vichy　had　given　it”permission’璽to　occupy　French
Indochina　in　its　efforts　to　block　the　flow　of　supplies　to　the　beleaguered　Chinese．
In　response　to　this　occupation，　the　US　halted　some　trade　with　Japan　and
undertook　other　measures　which　were　designed　to　put　pressure　on　the　Japanese．
The　goal　of　this　pressure　was　to　keep　Japan　from　attacking　to　the　south　into　the
Dutch　colonies　of　Indonesia　and　to　express　dissatisfaction　with　what　they　were
doing　in　China（Utely，　p．136）．
　　　The　idea　of　fighting　a　war　with　Japan　was　anatherna　to　American　leaders，
as　the　US－not　prepared　for　war　in　the　Pacific－did　not　want　to　be　engaged
on　two　fronts　should　it　become　entangled　in　the　ongoing　war　in　Europe（Utely，
p．157）．Nevertheless，　the　US　did　make　plans　for　how　to　contain　Japan　should　it
attack　to　the　south，　and　moved　its　fleet　to　Pearl　Harbor　as　part　of　that　plan
（Utely，　p．84）．　In　addition，　there　was　a　certain　amount　of　hubris　among　the
Americans　and　the　British　about　how　difficult　defeating　Japan　in　the　event　of　a
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war　could　be．　The　British，　for　example，　thought　their　garrison　in　Singapore　was
virtually　impregnable－to　the　extent　that　prior　to　the　war　General　Robert
Brooke－Popham，　the　Commander　of　British　forces　in　the”Far　East”was　quoted
while　reviewing　his　troops，”Don’t　you　think　they　are　worthy　of　some　better
enemy　than　the　Japanese？lf（Dower，　p．99）．　The　Americans　as　well　could　not
imagine　that　Japan　would　have　anything　to　gain　from　an　attack　on　American
forces－either　the　forces　already　in　place　in　the　PhilipPines　or　the　fleet　at　Pearl
Harbor．　Undoubtedly，　unadulterated　racism　played　a　part　in　this　view，　but　also
the　enormous　productive　capacity　of　the　US　cornpared　to　the　relatively
miniscule　industrialization　of　Japan　was　seen　as　a　major　deterrent　to　Japanese
adventurism　against　US　or　British　interests　in　Southeast　Asia．　Many　Japanese
naval　leaders，　such　as　Admiral　Yamamoto　Isoroku，　had　studied　and　lived　in　the
US　and　knew　well　what　its　capabilities　were．　Actual　plans　for　defense　of　the
US　against　the　Japanese，　were　restricted　to　naval　defense　of　the　Western
Hemisphere（Utely，　p．113）．　The　British　Navy　would　have　to　protect　Singapore
and　Southeast　Asia．
　　　The　American　public　also　was　not　being　infused　with　a　daily　dose　of　anti－
Japanese　publicity．　Despite　the　sinking　of　an　American　naval　vessel　in　China　by
the　Japanese，　the　reaction　was　relatively　mild．　Time　Magazine　reported　on
December　27，1937，0nly　fifteen　days　after　the　sinking　of　the　US　warship，
Incidents　such　as　the　sinking　last　fortnight　of　the　Panay　by　Japanese　aircraft
are　among　the　immediate　causes　of　wars．　But　last　week　the　incident　aroused
no　outcry，　no　demand　in　Congress　or　the　press　that　the　U．　S．　Navy
immediately　steam　across　the　Pacific　to　blow　Tokyo　off　the　map．　What　was
remarkable　was　that　it　produced　precisely　the　opposite　effect．　While　the　State
Department　was　engaged　in　sending　the　sharpest　notes　since　the　World　War，
reaction　of　the　U．　S．　generally　was　alarm，　not　that　Japan　would　go
unpunished，　but　that　the　offense　might　somehow　involve　the　U　S．　in　war
（Panay　Pandemonium，1937，¶3）．
One　could　only　imagine　what　might　have　come　of　an　effort　to”steam　across　the
Pacific　to　blow　Tokyo　off　the　map”，　but　it　is　a　good　example　of　the　superior
feeling　many　in　the　US　had　towards　the　Japanese．　Chief　of　Naval　Operations
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William　Leahy　favored　a　show　of　force　that　would”teach　the　Japanese　a　lesson”
（Utely，　p．27），　but　the　crisis　passed　without　the　Americans　doing　anything
（Utely，　p．31）．　Even　after　the　Nanking　massacre　which　started　in　December　of
1937，Time　Magazine，　for　example，　reported　the　event　only　four　times　in　the
following　year．　In　fact　a　search　of　the　Time　archives　from　Dec．1937　to　Dec．
1941reveals　no　other　mention　of　the　massacre．　Some　reports　were　even
”balanced”to　the　extent　that　while　the　depravity　of　the　event　was　disclosed，
Japanese　efforts　to”atone”were　also　presented．　In　the　Apri118，1938　edition　of
Time，　for　example，”There　has　been　the　most　drastic　shakeup　by　Tokyo　of
officers　whose　Japanese　soldiers　went　berserk　in　Nanking”，　was　reported（Basket
Cases，1938，¶1）．
　　　The　American　policy　in　the　late　1930s　was　simply　to　hope　that　the　war　in
China　would　become　so　wearing　on　the　Japanese　that　the”military　clique”
would　fall　from　power　and　the’蟹moderates”be　restored　to　influence　in　the
Japanese　government－wishful　thinking（Utely，　p．35）．　Reports　from　the　war
in　China，　however，　while　falling　short　of　stimulating　the　American　public　to　a
war　fever，　did　bring　civic　opposition　to　continued　trade　with　Japan．　It　was　after
all　American　gasoline　and　steel　that　were　putting　Japanese　pilots　into　the　air　to
bomb　hapless　Chinese　civilians（Utely，　p．54）．　Piecemeal　sanctions　were
implemented　against　Japan　during　1938　and　1939，　and　the　US　Pacific　fleet　was
moved”without　public　fanfare”to　Pearl　Harbor　in　the　spring　of　1940（Utely，　p．
84）．
　　　December　7，1941　dawned　on　an　America　which　was　nervously　watching
events　in　Europe　and　in　the　l’Far　East”，　but　did　not　imagine　how　soon　it　would
itself　becorne　embroiled　in　war．
The　Pacific　War
　　　Admiral　Yamamoto　Isoroku　who　was　primarily　responsible　for　the
preparations　for　the　attack　on　Pearl　Harbor　is　well－known　to　have　opposed
attacking　the　United　States．　Despite　his　misgivings，　however，　he　committed
himself　to　the　successful　implementation　of　national　policy　and　launched　the
attack　on　December　8，1941．
　　　The　attack　went　very　well　indeed，　as　the　bulk　of　America’s　Pacific　fleet　was
put　out　of　action．　The　concept　of　the　primacy　of　the　battleship　still　reigned
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supreme　in　most　military　and　political　circles，　and　so　the　loss　of　so　many　heavy
warships　at　Pearl　Harbor　was　a　devastating　blow．　The　fact　that　US　aircraft
carriers　were　not　in　port　was　the　only　silver　lining　to　that　day　which　would
”live　in　infamy”．
　　　Following　quickly　on　the　heels　of　the　Pearl　Harbor　victory，　the　Japanese
plunged　headlong　into　attacks　across　the　southern　Pacific　and　Southeast　Asia．
Troops　were　landed　in　Malaya　on　the　same　day　as　the　attacks　in　Hawaii　and
began　their　rapid　movement　down　the　peninsula　to　Singapore．　On　the　8th，　the
British　battleship，　Prince　of　Wales，　and　battlecruiser，　Repulse，　along　with　four
other　vessels　were　sent　to　the　South　China　Sea　in　an　effort　to　intercept　any
Japanese　forces　which　might　be　attempting　to　make　landings　in　Malaya．　They
fell　prey　to　an　aircraft　attack　from　Saigon　on　the　10th　and　were　both　sunk．
These　were　the　first　capital　ships　which　were　sunk　at　sea　by　aircraft　while
engaged　in　actively　defending　themselves，　and　their　loss　was　an　enormous
shock　to　the　British　military　and　government（Wikipedia［1］，2005，¶2）．
　　　Supposedly　impregnable，　Singapore　fell　to　General　Yamashita　Tomoyuki’s
onslaught　on　February　15，1942，　despite　the　fact　that　his　forces　were
outnumbered　and　essentially　operating　on　a　shoestring（Dunnigan，　p．565）．　The
Japanese　immediately　began　to　set　the　tone　for　their　behavior　towards　Allied
prisoners　of　war　and　others　who　fell　under　their　control　by　massacring　the
patients　and　staff　of　a　hospital　in　Singapore．（Wikipedia［2］，2005，¶23）．
　　　It　seemed　that　nothing　could　stop　the　Japanese．　Building　their　Pacific
perimeter，　the　Japanese　took　Wake　Island－attacked　on　the　same　day　as　the
Pearl　Harbor　raid－on　December　23rd．　The　British　Crown　Colony　of　Hong
Kong　surrendered　on　Christmas　Day，1941．　The　strategic　town　of　Rabaul　in
New　Britain　was　attacked　and　taken　over　by　Japanese　forces　in　January　of
1942．Australian　POWs　captured　in　that　battle　also　suffered　under　the　control
of　the　Japanese　troops．　Only　the　resistance　of　American　and　Filipino　forces　in
Bataan　and　Corregidor　in　the　Philippines　put　an　unexpected　obstacle　in　the　way
of　the　Japanese　advance，　holding　out　until　early　April　of　1942．　The　Bataan
Death　March　was　the　result　of　American　surrender　to　Japanese　forces．
　　　　The　brutal　treatment　of　Allied　POWs　by　the　Japanese　needs　no
documentation　here．　The　horrible　realities　of　this　experience，　however，　were
not　generally　known　until　late　in　the　war　by　the　American　public　at　large．
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Although　some　US　soldiers，　for　example，　managed　to　escape　the　Bataan　Death
March　and　report　on　Japanese　atrocities，　their　news　did　not　reach　the　US　media
until　February　of　1944，　well　after，　for　example，　the　battles　of　Guadalcanal　and
Tarawa　and　long　after　the　tide　had　already　turned　against　Imperial　Japan．
Time　Magazine　reported　on　Lieut．　Colonel　William　E．　Dyess’s　report　about
Japanese　treatment　of　captured　Allied　soldiers　in　its　February　7th，1944　edition
（The　Nature　of　the　Enemy，1944）．　The　overall　treatment　of　Allied　POWs，
however，　did　not　set　the　stage　for　how　US　troops　reacted　to　Japanese　forces　in
battle．　The　contact　between　the　two　on　the　battlefield　did．
　　　The　first　encounters　between　US　and　Japanese　ground　forces　which
resulted　in　reports　returning　to　the　US（US　victories）and　which”conditioned”
the　battlefield　behavior　of　the　two　sides，　were　in　the　battles　in　the　Aleutians　and
Guadalcana1．　In　both　of　these　encounters，　the　forces　arrayed　against　each　other
were　relatively　equal．　In　both，　the　IJA　was　still　able　to　either　supply　or
evacuate　its　forces．　In　the　late　spring　of　1942，　the　Allies　attacked　the　Japanese
base　at　Attu　Island　in　the　Aleutians，　by－passing　the　larger　base　on　Kiska．　Of　the
4700defenders，　only　30　POWs　were　taken，　despite　the　dropping　of　surrender
leaflets　by　the　Americans（Dunnigan，　p．696）．　Many　Japanese　soldiers　finished
their　commitment　to　defend　the　island　in　a”banzai　charge”，　an　expression　that
US　forces　used　to　describe　last－ditch，　suicidal　attacks　by　IJA　troops　in　many　of
the　Pacific　battles．　The　Americans　learned　for　the　first　time　how　the　Japanese
soldier　would　be　fighting　the　war．　A　later　attack　on　Kiska　revealed　that　all　of
the　Japanese　soldiers　had　been　evacuated　under　the　cover　of　a　small　force
which　was　left　behind．　The　members　of　that　force　committed　suicide，　rather
than　fall　into　the　hands　of　the　enemy（World　War　II　Multimedia　Database，2005，
¶4）．
　　　On　Guadalcana1，　the　length　of　the　campaign（Aug．1942　to　Feb．1943）gave
the　troops　of　both　sides　ample　opportunity　to　learn　about　each　other’s　battlefield
behavior．　The　see－saw　nature　of　the　battle　meant　that　American　soldiers　would
occasionally　fall　into　Japanese　hands．　These　would　invariably　be　killed，　often
after　torture．　Coming　upon　the　remains　of　their　comrades　who　were，　for
example，　bent　over　a　log，　and　killed　with　a　bayonet　in　the　anus（ODonnell，　p．
60）did　not　predispose　the　Americans，　for　their　part，　to　treat　Japanese　captives
any　more　considerately．　American　Marines　on　Guadalcanal　would　simply　shoot
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the　few　Japanese　who　attempted　to　surrender（0曾Donnell，　p．60）．　This　was，　of
course，　a　war　crime（Int蟹l　Committee　of　the　Red　Cross［2］，2005，¶6）．　As　Japanese
were　not　supposed　to　surrender（and　had　no　training　about　how　to　do　so），　these
killings　only　reinforced　their　commitment　to　die　in　battle　or　by　their　own　hand
when　facing　capture．　Admittedly，　the　nature　of　the　battle　made　it　difficult　for
the　Japanese，　at　least，　to　process　POWs．　Starving　and　under　constant　attack，
there　was　no　way　that　they　could　provide　the　protection　and　care　required　by
the　Geneva　Conventions．　Reading　the　Geneva　Conventions　of　1929　in　the
context　of　the　horrific　battles　in　the　Pacific　makes　their　almost　quaint
requirements　seem　something　of　a　cruel　joke．　Consider　the　following　excerpts：
TITLE　III．　CAPTIVITY．
SECTION　I．　EVACUATION　OF　PRISONERS　OF　WAR．
ARTICLE　7．
Prisoners　of　war　shall　be　evacuated　within　the　shortest　possible　period　after
their　capture，　to　spots　located　in　a　region　far　enough　from　the　zone　of　combat
for　them　to　be　out　of　danger．
O　D　．
SECTION　II．　PRISONERS－OF－WAR　CAMPS．
ARTICLE　9．
Prisoners　captured　in　unhealthful　regions　or　where　the　climate　is　injurious
for　persons　coming　from　temperate　regions，　shall　be　transported，　as　soon　as
possible，　to　a　more　favorable　climate．
CHAPTER　2．　Food　and　Clothing　of　Prisoners　of　War．
ARTICLE　11．
The　food　ration　of　prisoners　of　war　shall　be　equal　in　quantity　and　quality　to
that　of　troops　at　base　camps．
Furthermore，　prisoners　shall　receive　facilities　for　preparing，　themselves，
additional　food　which　they　might　have．
Sufficiency　of　potable　water　shall　be　furnished　them．　The　use　of　tobacco　shall
be　permitted．　Prisoners　may　be　employed　in　the　kitchens．
（lnt’1　Committee　of　the　Red　Cross［1］，2005）
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．．．and　on　and　on．　For　Japanese　troops　who　had　no　rations　and　no　way　to　be
evacuated　from　the　battle　zone　themselves，　there　was　little　they　could　do　with
the　odd　American　who　happened　to　fall　into　their　hands．　For　their　part，　they
would　not　suffer　the”disgrace”of　becoming　prisoners　of　war　in　any　case．　A
monthly　census（Appendix　A）of　POWs　being　held　in　the　US　presents　this　most
starkly．　Some　prisoners　were　sent　to　Australia　and　New　Zealand　and　some　kept
in　the　regions　where　they　were　captured，　but　the　same　dispersion　also　applied　to
German　POWs．　The　data　reveals　that　Japanese　battlefield　ethic　simply　did　not
allow　for　surrender．　In　fact，　at　the　end　of　the　war，　the　US　held　only　ll，600
Japanese　POWs　in　all　of　its　POW　camps（Dunnigan，　p．513）．
　　　The　battle　for　New　Guinea，　which　started　in　November　of　1942，　also
exposed　the　Americans　to　a　foe　the　likes　of　which　they　had　never　imagined．
Although　Prime　Minister　Tojo　Hideki　had　issued　a　Field　Service　Code　to　soldiers
on　January　8，1941　which　admonished　Japanese　soldiers，，’As　long　as　you　are
alive，　you　will　not　accept　the　disgrace　of　becoming　a　prisoner；in　death　you　will
avoid　the　stigma　of　this　offense”（探検コム，2006，¶17），　the　fighting　in　China　had
already　established　the　principle　that　Japanese　troops　fought　to　the　death．　In
fact，　the　Imperial　Rescript　to　Soldiers　of　the　Meiji　Era，　issued　in　1882　encouraged
the　Japanese　soldier　to　consider　that　while”duty　is　as　heavy　as　a　mountain，
death　is　as　light　as　feather”（田村［2］，¶8）．
　　　What　this　meant　on　the　battlefield　was　that　Japanese　soldiers　were
expendable，　throw－away　items，　a　general’s　dream．　A　US　soldier　recollected　that
on　the　battlefield　in　New　Guinea，　as　he　and　other　American　troops　moved
forward，　they　could　hear　the　sounds　of　hand　grenades　going　off　just　ahead　of
their　advance．　As　it　turned　out，　Japanese　soldiers　had　been　positioned　in　holes
along　the　lines　of　potential　US　attack　and　had　been　given　instructions　to　blow
themselves　up　to　signal　which　way　the　attack　was　coming（0’Donnell，　p．128）．
Arnericans　were　willing　to　sacrifice　themselves　in　the　war，　but　it　is　difficult　to
imagine　American　soldiers　accepting　an　order　to　blow　themselves　up　as
signaling　devices．　The　seeming　lack　of　respect　Japanese　soldiers　had　for　their
own　lives　spilled　over　to　the　American　soldiers’attitudes　towards　them．
　　　Again　on　New　Guinea，　the　way　Japanese　dealt　with　captured　Americans
provoked　only　hatred　among　their　counterparts．　American　soldiers　found　the
remains　of　their　comrades　who　had　unquestionably　been　eaten　by　the　Japanese
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（0’Donnell，　p．122＆128）．　Accounts　of　Japanese　cannibalism　of　their　own　and
Arnerican　dead　are　too　numerous　to　list　here，　but　the　underlying　current　of
feeling　among　US　troops　was　that　the　enemy　was　not　only　fanatical　but　also
inhuman．
　　　Inadequate　supply　made　starvation　a　common　occurrence　among　Japanese
troops　on　the　widely　flung　islands　of　the　Pacific，　and　in　the　longer　battles，
cannibalism　was　perhaps　the　only　way　they　had　to　survive．　These”mitigating
circumstances”，　however，　were　lost　on　the　US　soldier　who　fought　with　the
realization　that　his　enemy　could　not　be　induced　to　surrender　and　would
probably　torture　and　kill　him　if　he　should　give　up．　It　became　a　fight　to　the
death　on　both　sides　－the　Japanese　principle　of　no－surrender　prevailing．
Censorship　kept　Americans　back　horne　unaware　of　the　manner　in　which
Japanese　forces　were　treating　their　captured　sons．　Time　Magazine，　for　example，
on　August　2，1943　mentions　the　issue　of　US　soldiers　dying　at　a　high　rate　in
Japanese　POW　camps，　but　goes　on　to　say，”the　War　Department　has　made　no
charge　of　maltreatment”（Gold　Stars，1943，¶1）．　It　was　only　to　the　soldier　in　the
field　and　among　military　and　political　leaders　that　the　nature　of　the　enemy　was
known．　Their　view　came　to　be　that　the　US　faced　an”alien「量foe　which　could　not
be　comprehended．
　　　American　soldiers　did　not　go　into　combat　thinking　they　had　to　die．
Avoiding　death　while　carrying　out　one’s　duty　was　the　way　Americans　fought
the　war．　To　this　extent，　Americans　would　surrender　when　their　situations
became　hopeless．　The　Japanese　soldier　on　the　other　hand，　did　not　expect　to　live，
especially　if　the　battle　was　going　against　him．　Taking　his　own　life　rather　than
allowing　himself　to　be　captured　was　part　of　his　duty．　Even　when　wounded　and
left　lying　on　the　battlefield　barely　able　to　move，　Japanese　soldiers　would　try　to
kill　Americans　with　their　last　breath．　The　result　was　that　American　soldiers，
picking　their　way　over　Japanese　casualties　on　the　battlefield，　would　simply
shoot　any　wounded　Japanese　as　a　risk－avoidance　action（0’Donnell，　p．141）．
This，　of　course，　is　a　war　crime．　The　US　was　a　signatory　to　the　Geneva
Convention　of　1864　which　states，”Article　6．　Wounded　or　sick　combatants，　to
whatever　nation　they　may　belong，　shall　be　collected　and　cared　for”（Int’1
Committee　of　the　Red　Cross［2］，2005，¶6）．　Japanese　soldiers　would　also　feign
surrender　only　to　blow　themselves　up　as　Americans　approached（Straus，　p．116）．
一96一
「現代社会におけるコミュニケーションの諸租」
Japanese　troops　felt　obliged　to　fight　to　the　death　and　the　American　soldier　felt
little　regret　in　helping　him　to　achieve　his　goal．
　　　It　got　worse，　much　worse．　In　the　assault　on　Tarawa，　an　island　that　is　only
3．7kilometers　long　and　800　meters　wide－smaller　than　New　York’s　Central
Park（Dunnigan，　p．602）－Marines　would　confront　an　implacable　foe．　The
battle　began　on　November　20，1943　and　lasted　only　until　the　23rd．　During
those　four　days，　the　Marines　suffered　3，301　casualties，　including　1，188　dead．
This　figure　does　not　include　combat　deaths　among　navy　personne1．　For　their
part，　the　Japanese　forces　began　the　battle　with　4，836　defenders，　including
Korean　laborers．　When　the　battle　ended，　Japanese　military　prisoners　numbered
17with　129　Korean　laborers　also　falling　into　US　hands（Stevens，2003）．　The
slaughter　caught　the　attention　of　the　American　public　and　there　was　a　howl　of
protest　criticizing　the　attack　and　its　heavy　losses．　Articles　in　Time　Magazine　at
the　time　reflect　the　defensiveness　of　Naval　and　Marine　commanders　as　to　the
losses（Some　Will　Be　Killed，1943，＆Postscript　on　Tarawa，1944）．　Incidentally，
Time　Magazine　also　reported　that　the　New　York　Daily　News　and　the
Washington　Times－Herald　printed　an　editorial　entitled，”We　Should　Have　Used
Gas　At　Tarawa”（Should　the　U．S．　Use　Gas？，1944）．　The　Time　report　concluded
that　there　was　no　need　to　use　gas　as”conventiona1”weapons　were　up　to　the
task，　but　also　pointed　out　that　the　US　was　not　a　signatory　to　the　two
international　agreements　banning　the　use　of　poisonous　gas　in　battle．　There　was
clearly　contemplation　of　using　weapons　that　most　of　the　rest　of　the　world
thought　inhumane．　This　thinking　continued　when　the　invasion　of　Japan
reached　the　planning　stages（Skates，　p．93）．
　　　With　the　loss　of　Tarawa　and　the　naval　catastrophe　at　Midway　in　June　of
1942，the　Japanese　military　command　had　to　be　considering　the　hopelessness　of
continuing　the　war．　The　American　insistence　on”unconditional　surrender”，
however，　pushed　Japanese　leaders（as　it　did　leaders　in　Germany）to　conclude
that　they　had　no　alternative　but　to　fight　on（Skates，　p．252）．　The　inexorable
advance　of　US　forces　across　the　Pacific　and　the　tightening　of　the　noose　around
the　home　islands，　only　pushed　the　IJA　to　adopt　a　strategy　of　inflicting　as　many
casualties　as　possible　on　the　Americans　in　hope　that　they　rnight　lose　heart　and
become　willing　to　negotiate　a　peace－apeace　that　would　leave　the　colonies　in
China，　the　IJA，　or　at　least　the　Irnperial　throne　intact．　Suffering　the　heavy
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casualties　as　they　ploughed　across　the　Pacific　from　island　to　island，　the
Americans　only　hardened　their　resolve　to　bring　the　war　directly　to　Japan　and
its　peOPle．
　　　Fighting　in　the　Solomons　continued　unabated，　but　in　the　early　campaigns　in
the　Marshall　Islands，　including　Kwajalein　and　Eniwetok，　the　Japanese　were
taken　by　surprise　and　American　forces　suffered　relatively　few　casualties．
Japanese　forces，　on　the　other　hand，　true　to　their　training，　died　in　droves．　On
Kwajalein，　the　garrison　of　8，675　suffered　7，870　killed．　On　Eniwetok，2，677
Japanese　died　with　fewer　than　a　hundred　being　taken　prisoner（Dunnigan，　p．
411）．The　surprise　factor　soon　dissipated，　however，　and　the　Japanese　began　to
exact　their　toll　in　blood　for　the　American　approach　towards　the　home　islands．
　　　Needing　forward　bases　to　launch　bombers　for　direct　attacks　on　the　Japanese
homeland，　the　Americans　invaded　Saipan　on　June　15，1944．　This　was　the　first
battlefield　where　Japanese　civilians　were　also　caught　up　in　the　conflict，　and
their　reaction　to　American　invasion　was　one　of　the　telling　points　in　the
American　attitude　towards　the　Japanese．　Japanese　soldiers　fight　to　the　death；
this　was　well　known，　but　seeing　thousands　of　Japanese　civilians　kill　themselves，
some　by　throwing　themselves　from　cliffs　was　a　shock　to　American　soldiers
（Dower，　p．45）．　Many　Japanese　soldiers　died　in　futile　banzai　charges　at　the　end
of　the　conflict．　Only　a　few　hundred　of　the　almost　30，000　Japanese　troops
became　POWs．　For　the　Americans，　the　cost　was　heavy　and　a　harbinger　of
things　to　come．9，567　US　soldiers　died　in　the　three－week　battle；16，348　were
wounded（Dunnigan，　p．538）．
　　　Only　weeks　later　on　the　20th　of　July，　the　invasion　of　Guam　began．18，500
1JA　defenders　protected　the　largest　island　in　the　Marianas，（The　United　States
Army［1］2003，　p．19）The　US　lost　2，214　men　in　this　battle　which　ended　on
August　10th（Japanese　stragglers　continued　to”fight”on，　including　Sgt．　Yokoi
Shoichi　who　was　finally　captured　on　January　24，1972）．　The　remainder　of　the
Japanese　garrison　was　largely　wiped　out．　American　soldiers　walked　the
battlefield　after　the　banzai　charges　and　killed　the　wounded　Japanese，　resorting
yet　again　to　this　common，　criminal　practice．　The　motive　seems　to　have　been
revenge，　and　fear　that　a　wounded　Japanese　soldier　would　try　to　make　an　attack
from　behind（0，Donnell，　p．138，141）．　These　single－shot　killings　after　a　battle
must　have　been　heard　by　remaining　Japanese　troops　who　could　only　have
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concluded　that　American　soldiers　had　no　intention　of　taking　any　prisoners．　The
reality　was　that－by　and　large－this　was　true．
　　　In　October　of　1944，　the　battle　for　the　Philippines　began　with　the　American
invasion　of　Leyte．　Defended　by　350，000　soldiers　under　the　command　of　Gen．
Yamashita　Tomoyuki，　the　strategy　was　to　defend　in　depth，　inflicting　as　many
casualties　as　possible．　The　conflict　would　still　be　underway　when　the　war
ended（Dunnigan，　p．500）．　On　the　21st，　the　Japanese　launched　the　first
organized　Kamikaze　attacks，　though　plans　for　such　units　were　under　way　well
before（Naito，　p．11）．　On　the　25th，　naval　Lieutenant　Seki　Yukio（23　years　old），
the　leader　of　the　squadron，　made　the　first　successful　attack　and　crashed　his
aircraft　onto　the　escort　carrier　St．　Lo，　sinking　it（殉国之碑，2002，¶16）．
　　　Then　there　was　Iwo　Jima．　Iwo　Jima　was　defended　by　22，000　troops　under
the　command　of　Gen．　Kuribayashi　Tadamichi　who　had　plenty　of　time　to
honeycomb　the　island　with　caves　and　concealed　fortifications　to　provide　for　the
defense－in－depth　strategy　that　the　Japanese　hoped　would　convince　the
Americans　to　negotiate　a　more　favorable　peace．　Gen．　Kuribayashi　forbade　the
banzai　charge　that　had　become　the　desperate　trademark　of　overwhelmed
Japanese　defenders，　requiring　instead　that　they　stay　in　their　bunkers　and　fight
to　the　death．　The　Americans　put　ashore　30，000　troops　on　February　19th，1945
alone，　but　before　the　island　was「，secure”on　March　26th，　they　had　suffered　over
28，000casualties，　including　6，821　dead．　The　Japanese　garrison　gave　up　1083
POWs，　many　captured　badly　wounded　and　unconscious（Dunnigan，　p．294，　and
Newcomb，1982，¶30）．
　　　Germany　surrendered　in　May　of　1945，　leaving　Japan　to　face　the　Allies
alone．　The　ever　increasing”fanaticism”of　Japanese　resistance　the　closer　the
Americans　came　to　the　home　islands　induced　the　Americans　to　resort　to　any
measures　to　force　surrender．　The　application　of　firebombing　raids（started
against　Germany）in　March　1945　burned　out　large　sections　of　Japan，s　major
cities　and　killed　hundreds　of　thousands　of　civilians．　The　architect　of　these
attacks，　Major　Gen．　Curtis　LeMay　himself　said　that　he　would　probably　be　tried
as　a　war　criminal　if　Japan　were　to　win　the　war（Wikipedia［3］，2006，¶9）．
Germany，　however，　had　not　surrendered　on　account　of　the　similar　destruction
of　its　urban　areas，　so　there　was　little　hope　that　bombing　alone　would　induce
Japan’s　surrender　either（anesi．com，1996，　p．21）．
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　　　American　strategy　against　Japan　had　three　parts：first　was　to　cut　off　Japan
from　its　colonial　possessions　and　supplies　by　blockade－something　that　was
largely　accomplished　by　submarines；the　second　was　to　destroy　Japan’s　rnilitary
capability　and”demoralize”its　citizenry　by　bombing；and　finally，　the　third　was
to　invade　the　home　islands　and　occupy　the　country（United　States　Army［2］，
2001，p．527）．
　　　With　bombing　in　full　swing，　and　the　submarine　blockade　in　effective
operation　against　Japanese　shipping　everywhere　except　in　the　Japan　Sea，　the
invasion　of　the　home　islands　began　in　Okinawa．　Once　again，　the　Japanese
defense　goal　was　to　defend　to　the　last　man，　inflicting　as　many　casualties　as
possible．　The　proximity　to　the　main　islands　of　Japan　brought　out　the　Kamikazes
in　waves　and　their　attacks　inflicted　large　numbers　of　US　naval　casualties．　In
fact，　the　US　Navy　suffered　almost　20％of　its　casualties　for　the　entire　war（both
theaters）in　this　one　battle－mostly　due　to　Kamikaze　attack（The　Little　Ships，
1945，¶1）．Even　the　flagship　of　the　Japanese　fleet，　the　superbattleship　Yamato，
was　sent　out　on　a　suicide　mission　to　attack　the　US　landing　vessels　in　Okinawa
（Yoshida，　p．17）．　As　on　Saipan，　Japanese　civilians　caught　up　in　the　battle　killed
themselves　rather　than　be　taken　prisoner（Cook，　p．365）．　American　casualties
were　high；12，281　combat　deaths　and　more　than　50，000　wounded．　Japanese
deaths　were　over　150，000，　including　thousands　of　civilians（Dunnigan，　p．458）．
The　high　casualty　rate　caused『by　the　to－the－death　defense　of　Japanese　forces
and　the　apparent　willingness　of　even　Japanese　civilians　to　commit”group
suicide”rather　than　be　captured　made　a　deep　impression　on　American　leaders．
What　might　ensue　with　the　invasion　of　Kyushu？
　　　Justification　for　the　use　of　the　atomic　bomb　has　been　that　the　invasion　of
Japan　would　have　cost　America　half　a　million　or　even　a　million　casualties．
While　these　post－war　estimates　are　clearly　exaggerations（Fensch，　p．56），　there　is
no　doubt　that　concerns　about　high　casualty　rates　pressed　American　leaders　to
find　as　quick　an　end　to　the　war　as　possible．　While　there　was　debate　about　how
to　do　this，　Truman　approved　the　invasion　of　Kyushu　for　November　1，1945，　but
also　authorized　the　use　of　the　atomic　bomb　against”military　targets”．　What
constituted　a”military　target”，　however，　was　open　to　interpretation．　Maj．　Gen．
Curtis　LeMayls　bombers　had　been　flying　low－level，　incendiary　attacks　against
Japanese　cities　since　March　and　there　were　few　left　untouched．　Truman
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himself　stated　that　we”cannot　drop　that　terrible　bomb　on　the　old　capital　or　the
new「，C　indicating　that　while　those　cities　were　off　limits，　other　cities　might　be
considered（Truman　Presidential　Museum＆Library［2］，　p．5）．
　　　Nobody　could　doubt，　however，　that　the　American　public　was　weary　of　war
and　wanted　as　fast　an　end　to　it　as　possible．　A　long，　drawn－out　blockade（which
still　would　have　included　continued　bombing　of　Japanese　cities）would　not　have
ended　the　war　quickly．　For　example，”Ninety－seven　percent　of　Japan’s　stocks　of
guns，　shells，　explosives，　and　other　military　supplies　were　thoroughly　protected
in　dispersed　or　underground　storage　depots，　and　were　not　vulnerable　to　air
attack”（anesi．com，1996，　p．18）．　In　any　case，　the　moral　issues　of　bombing　civilian
targets　had　already　been　ignored－first　in　the”terror”bombing　of　German
cities　and　later　in　the　low－level　firebomb　raids　over　Japan．　The　atomic　bomb
was　simply　a　more　efficient　means　of　delivering　the　same　type　of　attack．
During　his　visit　to　Potsdam　for　the　conference　with　Churchill　and　Stalin，
Truman　confided　in　his　notes，”．．．　I　fear　that　machines　are　ahead　of　morals　by
some　centuries．．．”（Truman　Presidential　Museum＆Library［3］，　p．10）．
　　　Truman　seemed　to　have　felt，　as　the　soldier　in　the　field　did，　that　anything
that　could　be　apPlied　to　force　Japanls　surrender　should　be　used，　and　that
without　employing　every　possible　measure　such　surrender　might　not　be
effectuated．　He　approved　the　invasion　of　the　home　islands，　authorized　dropping
the　atomic　bomb，　and　he　encouraged　the　Soviet　Union　to　also　get　involved　in
the　war－that　being　something　which　he　thought　would　be　the　final　blow　to
end　Japanese　resistance（Truman　Presidential　Museum＆Library［2］，　p．9）．
There　was　a　domestic　political　issue　involved　as　well．　It　is　likely　that　had
Truman　decided　against　using　the　atomic　bomb　and　had　Americans　suffered
serious　casualties　in　a　subsequent　invasion，　the　war－weary　American　public
would　not　have　been　happy　to　find　out　later　that　a”superweapon”that　might
have　ended　the　war　earlier　was　not　used．
　　　Finally，　the　Emperor　overcame　Japanese　Military　opposition　and　proclaimed
the　acceptance　of　the　Potsdam　conditions　for　surrender　on　August　15th，1945．
Efforts　by　some　Japanese　military　officers　to　prevent　the　surrender　were
unsuccessful，　but　Minister　of　War　Anami　committed　sepρuku　in　his　house（The
Pacific　War　Research　Society，　p．294），　and　other　military　men　went　on　final
Kamikaze　missions（Ugaki，　p．665）for　they　still　believed　that　only　by　drawing
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the　Americans　into　a　final　orgy　of　bloodletting　on　the　home　islands　could　they
force　more　acceptable　terms　for　ending　the　war．（Ugaki　p．659）．
Conclusion
　　　The　conduct　of　war　always　seems　to　fall　to　the　lowest　common
denominator，　and　the　Japanese　Imperial　Army　set　the　bar　low．　That　having
been　said，　the　cultural　expectations　of　the　soldier　on　the　battlefield　were　so
different　between　the　Japanese　and　the　American，　that　each　hardly　knew　what
to　make　of　the　other．　That　Arnericans　would　surrender　came　as　a　shock　to
Japanese　troops　who　were　ill－prepared　to　deal　with　them　and　held　them　in　very
low　esteem　as　a　result　of　their　unexpected　action．　The　fact　that　Japanese　would
not　surrender　but　would　rather　commit　suicide　or　rush　out　of　their　prepared
defenses　to　be　slaughtered　in　senseless　banzai　charges，　only　convinced　the
Americans　that　they　faced　an　inhuman　and　fanatical　foe．　Their　response　was　to
kill　as　many　as　possible，　resulting　in　a　vicious　circle　where　even　when　Japanese
contemplated　surrender，　they　feared　that　they　would　be　killed　outright　by　the
Americans．　The　Japanese　use　of　suicide　weapons，　Kamikaze，　Kaiten　and　others，
only　reinforced　the　American　view　that　the　Japanese　were　a　nation　apart（the
Germans　had　not　pursued　this　type　of　attack），　and　that　any　mechanism　that
would　bring　them　to　their　knees　should　be　used．　Additionally，　aspects　of　the
Japanese　spirit　of　Bushido　which　had　been　instilled　in　every　Japanese　through
education，　formed　the　basis　for　a　belief　that　the”Japanese　spirit”could　overcome
any　adversity．　This　belief　continued　to　be　the　raison　d冒etre　of　the　Imperial
Japanese　Army　which　controlled　the　government　throughout　the　war　and
which　very　nearly　succeeded　in　bringing　an　end　to　Japan　as　a　nation．　The
Americans，　for　their　part，　wanted　a　conclusion　to　the　bloodletting　and　became
willing　partners　in　the　apparent　Japanese　intent　on　national　suicide．　Had　the
bombs　been　available（and　eventually　they　would　have），　the　US　had　the
delivery　capability　to　put　an　atomic　bomb　on　every　Japanese　city　of　30，000
people　or　larger　in　one　day（anesi．com，1996，　p．30）．
　　　The　Japanese　soldier’s　powerlessness　to　surrender　in　the　field　was　reflected
in　the　Japanese　government’s　inability　to　find　a　way　to　give　up　as　well．　Even
Time　Magazine　reported　at　the　height　of　the　Okinawa　campaign，”Now　the　next
step　was　clear：to　persuade　the　Japanese　nation　that　inevitable　defeat　does　not
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mean　that　the　race　will　be　wiped　out，　or　that　its　future　is　everlastingly　hopeless．
If　the　ill－matched　communication　systems　between　Japanese　and　American
minds　could　somehow　be　bridged，　the　war　might　be　shortened”．　It　went　on　to
mention　that　President　Truman　had　already　stated　that　surrender”does　not
mean　the　extermination　or　enslavement　of　the　Japanese　people”（Power　v．
Statesmanship，　Jul．16，1945，¶5＆7）．　The　Japanese　government　tried　to　enlist
the”good　offices”of　the　Soviet　Union　to　help　them　figure　a　way　to　surrender，
but　the　Soviet　Union　was　stalling　for　time　as　they　intended　to　enter　the　war　for
afinal　land－grab．　Moreover，　the　Japanese　responses　to　the　Potsdam　Declaration
were　equivocal　and　interpreted　as　a　rebuke　by　the　Americans（The　Pacific　War
Research　Society，　p．16－17）．　The　Potsdam　Declaration　clearly　mentions　that
Japanese　military　forces　would　be　allowed　to　return　to　Japan　to　live　normal
lives，　that　Japan　would　not　be”enslaved　as　a　race　or　destroyed　as　a　nation”，　and
that　occupying　forces　would　eventually　be　withdrawn　from　the　country（Birth
of　the　Constitution　of　Japan，2003－2004，¶9，10＆12）．　But　although　the
Americans　had　decided　that　the　Emperor　was　needed　in　the　post－war
environment　to　assure　the　surrender　of　the　large　and　far－flung　Japanese　Army，
no　mention　was　made　of　his　role　in　the　Potsdarn　Declaration（Skates，　p．238－
239）．
　　　The　two　culturally　based　psychologies　of　war－one　of　no－surrender，　the
other　of　unconditional　surrender　or　annihilation－created　a　perfect　swirl　of
escalating　violence　that　finally　ended　with　the　first　use　of　atomic　bombs　on
essentially　civilian　targets．　Each　nation　violated　its　best　moral　principles　in　the
conflict．　The　Japanese　took　only　those　most　militant　aspects　of　the　Bushi　code，
and　made　them　the　core　of　their　national　being，　convincing　soldiers　and　citizens
from　all　walks　of　life　that　they　were　somehow　samurai　and　that　the　nation　was
asamurai　nation．　This　belief　and　the　fanatical　defense　that　surrounded　it
brought　Japan　to　within　a　hairsbreadth　of　national　suicide．　And　America，　a
country　that　did　not　want　to　enter　the　war　in　the　first　place，　turned　from　a
nation　which　had　been　a　leader　in　international　law，　into　a　combatant　for
which－from　the　foot　soldier　to　the　President－nothing　was　immora1．
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Appendix　A
Census　of　Prisoners　of　War　Interned　in　the　Continental　United　States（every　other　month
　　　shown　here）
End　of　Month　　　　Total　　　　　　German　　　　　　Italian　　　　　　Japanese
1942
June　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　33　　　　　　　　　　　　32　　　　　　　　　　　　－　　　　　　　　　　　　　1
August　　　　　　　　　　　65　　　　　　　　　55　　　　　　　　　　－　　　　　　　　　　10
0ctober　　　　　　　　　　　　　　183　　　　　　　　　　　　130　　　　　　　　　　　　　　－　　　　　　　　　　　　　　53
December　　　　　　　l，881　　　　　　　　512　　　　　　　1，317　　　　　　　　52
1943
January　　　　　　　　　　　　2，365　　　　　　　　　　　990　　　　　　　　　　1，313　　　　　　　　　　　　62
March　　　　　　　　　2，755　　　　　　　1，334　　　　　　　1，359　　　　　　　　　62
May　　　　　　　　　　36，083　　　　　　22，110　　　　　　　13，911　　　　　　　　　62
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July　　　　　　　　　　　　　　80，558　　　　　　　　　54，502　　　　　　　　　25，969
September　　　　　163，706　　　　　115，358　　　　　　48，253
November　　　　　　171，484　　　　　　122，350　　　　　　49，039
1944
January　　　　　　　　　　174，822　　　　　　　　124，880　　　　　　　　　49，826
March　　　　　　　　183，618　　　　　　133，135　　　　　　50，136
May　　　　　　　　　186，368　　　　　　135，796　　　　　　50，164
July　　　　　　　　　　　　224，863　　　　　　　　173，980　　　　　　　　　50，276
September　　　　　300，382　　　　　248，205　　　　　　51，034
November　　　　　360，455　　　　　306，856　　　　　　51，156
1945
January　　　　　　　　　　359，687　　　　　　　　306，306　　　　　　　　　50，561
March　　　　　　　　365，954　　　　　　312，144　　　　　　50，550
May　　　　　　　　　425，871　　　　　371，683　　　　　　50，273
July　　　　　　　　　　　　422，130　　　　　　　　367，513　　　　　　　　　49，789
August　　　　　　　　415，919　　　　　　361，322　　　　　　　49，184
〈http：／／www．uboat．net／men／pow／pow　in　america　stats．htm＞
7・558QりQり
　116
　347
　408
　607
1，143
2，443
2，820
3，260
3，915
4，828
5，413
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